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Abstract
One major outcome of the review of the ECB’s “two pillar monetary policy strategy”, which
was published on 8 May 2003, has been the de facto downgrading of the hitherto prominent
role assigned to the stock of money. According to the authors’ judgement, however, there is a
strong theoretical and empirical rationale for the ECB monetary policy to pay close attention
to the information content of money in the form of M3. However, the authors argue the ECB
should make use of the so-called “price gap” or “real money gap” concept rather than the re-
ference value as the latter runs the risk of giving misleading policy recommendations and
compromising the indicator quality of the stock of money. Making use of M3 seems all the
more rational as currently no better inflation indicator appears to exist in providing inflation
forecasts in the euro area.
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"The gold and silver money which circulates in any country may
very properly be compared to a highway, which, while it circulates
and carries to market all the grass and  corn of the country,
produces itself not a single pile of either"
A. Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776, p. 321.
1. Introduction
Numerous studies have shown that inflation has negative consequences for investment,
growth and employment. As a result, a monetary policy pursuing price stability can be consi-
dered as conducive to economic well being. Experience has shown that an overly expansiona-
ry monetary policy might yield output and employment gains in the short-run but is followed
by growth and employment losses in the longer term. To avoid that (small) short-term bene-
fits are traded off against (substantial) long-term costs, monetary policy requires an institutio-
nal framework conducive to maintaining price stability. Successful central banks are suppor-
ted by a constitution, which explicitly states price stability as the (primary) objective of mo-
netary policy, and grants political, financial and personnel independence to the central bank.
In addition, an explicitly announced monetary policy strategy – that is the framework gover-
ning the actual interest rate setting policy – can be seen as being highly important for commu-
nicating and delivering a price stability oriented monetary policy.
On 8 May 2003, the ECB Governing Council announced the results of the review of the “two
pillar monetary policy strategy”.
1 One major decision of the ECB was that the economic ana-
lysis (represented by the former “second strategy pillar”) shall now be used to identify short-
to medium-term risks to price stability. The monetary analysis (the former “first strategy pil-
lar”) will then follow to assess the medium- to long-term inflation trends. By doing so, ECB
has de facto downgraded the monetary analysis to second rank: The “prominent role” for-
merly assigned to money has been substituted for a “control variable” function of money. The
focus of this article is to analyse the rationale for money to play a leading role in the ECB’s
strategy. The article has been structured as follows. First, the elements and the rationale of the
former ECB strategy will be briefly outlined. Second, a critical look will be taken at the
implementation of the reference value concept and arguments are provided for substituting it
with the so-called “price gap” or “real money gap”. Third, a brief look will be taken at the
“rivalling” concepts of monetary and inflation targeting. Lastly, we summarize the findings.
                                                
1  For background studies on the ECB monetary policy strategy review see www.ecb.int.A case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy
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2. ECB strategy – design and performance
The ECB monetary policy strategy was chosen by explicitly adhering to a number of normati-
ve principles such as, for instance, “effectiveness”, “accountability”, “transparency” etc,
which were set up by the European Monetary Institute (EMI) in 1997 to assess the appropria-
teness of the alternative strategy candidates. Moreover, in formulating the strategy, the special
situation prevailing at the start of Stage Three had to be taken into account. In autumn 1998,
the ECB made public the elements of a so called stability-oriented monetary policy strategy,
which rested on two pillars:
-  The first pillar assigned a prominent role for money in the definition of M3, based on the
notion of the monetary origins of inflation. In indication of the prominent role it attached
to money in the formulation of its monetary policy, the ECB has announced a quantitative
reference value for monetary growth in December, which has been set at 4½ percent since
the start of Stage Three of EMU.
-  The second pillar consisted of a broad-based assessment both of the outlook regarding
price developments and of the risks to price stability in the euro area as a whole. This as-
sessment comprised analyses of information on the economic and financial situation, en-
suring that the ECB is as well informed as possible when making its monetary policy de-
cisions.
-  Moreover, the ex ante public announcement of a quantified definition of the final objecti-
ve of price stability has been considered as an indispensable part of any ECB strategy
candidate in order to enhance the transparency and credibility of the strategy.
2 Since the
beginning of EMU, the ECB has defined price stability as an annual increase of the Har-
monized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) of below 2.0%. As from 8 May 2003, the bank
aims to maintain inflation rates of close to 2% – “coming from below” – over the medium
term.
Forward-looking inflation targeting central banks tend to place the inflation forecast at the
centre of their analytical and communication frameworks, and use such a forecast ideally as if
it was an intermediate policy target. The ECB has received a level of criticism for not always
having changed rates systematically in line with the inflation forecast signals provided by the
two strategy pillars.
3 However, the use of considerable discretion in interpreting the signals of
its strategy has obviously not been detrimental to delivering price stability.
                                                
2  See European Monetary Institute (1997), p. 14.
3  For an analysis of the ECB rate setting behaviour see, for instance, Kösters, W., Leschke, M., Polleit, T.
(2003), How do central banks react? – A comparison between the European Central Bank and the US Federal
Reserve, forthcoming.A case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy
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The explanation for this may be found in the fact that the ECB policy has nevertheless met a
number of requirements, which are to be considered conducive to maintaining price stability,
namely:
4
-  the bank has made the stability mandate operational and transparent;
-  it has legitimised the price stability mandate by making the public aware of the costs of
inflation;
-  the bank made extensive effort in explaining the elements and rationale of its strategy to
the wide public;
-  it analysed and commented target deviations and empirically reviewing the properties of
the strategy variables used; and
-  it analysed the framework within which monetary policy is conducted (such as, for instan-
ce, reform processes in the product and factor markets, fiscal policy etc.).
Since the beginning of 1999, average inflation in the euro area has remained close to the
ECB’s upper inflation ceiling of 2.0 percent.
5 Moreover, inflation expectations, approximated
by the so-called “break-even” inflation of inflation-index bonds, seem to have remained
closely linked to the ECB’s price stability promise since the beginning of Stage Three (see
Figure 1). This finding can be interpreted as financial markets having considered the ECB’s
price stability mandate as credible even in periods when actual inflation exceeded the bank’s
2.0 percent ceiling. Regardless of the favourable performance, the prominent role of money in
the ECB strategy, in particular, has continued to attract criticism, both for conceptual and
communcation reasons. In some cases, it has been argued that the first pillar should be inte-
grated with the second
6, or that the policy focus on M3 be dropped altogether. In the follow-
ing section, we outline and critically assess the merits and the conceptual idea governing the
former first pillar.
                                                
4  See ECB OBSERVER, Die EZB-Strategie auf dem Prüfstand, Press Statement, 17. März 2003, pp. 4.
5  In the period January 1999 to February 2003, the annual increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer
Prices (HICP) averaged 1.99%. The maximum rate was 3.2% in May 2001, the minimum was 0.8% at the
beginning of 1999.
6  See, for instance, Sachverständigenrat, Jahresgutachten 2002/03, p. 303 and pp. 305.A case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy
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Data source: Bloomberg; own calculations. – Actual inflation measured as annual changes in the HICP; last
data point: February 2003; monthly data. – “Break-even”-inflation (BEI) calculated from the French inflation-
linked OATs; daily data. – For further explanation of the BEI see, for instance, Sack, B. (2000), Deriving in-
flation expectations from nominal and inflation-indexed Treasury yields, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Working Papers, 16 May 2000, www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/ 2000/200033/ 200033
pap.pdf.
3. Discussion about the role of money
3.1   The use of M3 and the reference value concept
From a stability-oriented monetary policy, the pre-announcement of an envisaged M3 growth
rate serves a number of purposes. Firstly, it contributes to the stabilisation of market agents’
expectations as the central bank’s reaction function in terms of forthcoming interest rate
changes should become more transparent. Secondly, the central bank can signal to wage ne-
gotiation partners the amount of money it is willing to provide, thereby setting a strict limit
for the funding of nominal wage increases through monetary policy. Thirdly, the pre-
announcement of money growth enhances the accountability of monetary policy. And
fourthly, the pre-announcement of M3 growth provides the ECB with a shield against political
pressure to trade off price stability against growth.A case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy
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As a rule, the rationale of focusing on the stock of money as an important inflation indicator
of monetary policy hinges on the aggregate’s statistical properties:
7
-  first, the demand function for M3 has been found to be stable over time: there is a stable
long-term relation between money, income and interest rates in the long term;
8
-  second, the central bank seems to be able to control the intermediate variable by using its
instruments in a predictable manner; and
-  third, changes in the monetary aggregate have to be followed by predictable changes in
the final objective of monetary policy.
The validity of the stock of money to function as a reliable inflation indicator depends essen-
tially on the trend stability of the demand for the money aggregate M3. Of course, there is a
risk that money demand could become unstable in the future (for instance, through the intro-
duction of financial innovations, changes in banks’ refinancing behaviour etc.).
9 At the same
time, however, there are a number of arguments lending comfort that the stock of M3 will
retain its information content for the foreseeable future:
10
-  First of all, the ECB monetary policy objective of keeping inflation stable should actually
prevent “monetary policy induced” shocks to money demand. This must be seen as an im-
portant factor: it is not too far-fetched to assume that the breakdown between the relation
between prices and money, which has been observed in various countries, is to a large
extent a consequence of a misguided monetary policy.
-  Second, a broadly defined money aggregate can be expected to “absorb” most of the
changes in banks’ and non-banks’ portfolio behavior.
                                                
7  For the demand for euro area M3 see, for instance, Coenen, G., Vega, J. L. (1999), The Demand for M3 in
the Euro Area; also Brand, C., Cassola, N. (2000), A money demand system for euro area M3. Supporting the
findings of the analyses, the ECB Council wrote in December 2002: “ there are at present no signs of
structural breaks or changes in the long-run fundamental relationship between money and prices in the euro
area which underlies the derivation of the reference value.” For a contrary view see Sachverständigenrat
2001/02, pp. 279. Here the long-term stability of money demand is questioned and, moreover, the null-
hypothesis of weak exogenity of the short-term interest rate for the demand for money – which is the pre-
condition for super-exogenity – is rejected at the 1% significance level. For the latest findings see also Brug-
geman, A., Donati, P., Warne, A. (2003), Is the demand for euro area M3 stable?,
http://www.ecb.int/pub/strategy/BruggemannDonatiWarne-money-demand.pdf. Also  Calza, A, Sousa, J.
(2003), Why has money demand been more stable in the euro area than in other economies? A literature re-
view, http://www.ecb.int/pub/strategy/CalzaSousa.pdf.
8  It should be noted that the demand for money represents nothing else than the reciprocal of the velocity of
money. If, for instance, a money unit is used 100 times for turnover purposes in a given period of time, it is
held for 1/100 of the time in the portfolios of money holders.
9  It should be noted that the risk of a hitherto stable relation between an indicator variable and prices becoming
unstable is not confined to the use of money but essentially inherent to any monetary policy strategy which
aims to influence the price level by making use of an intermediate target or forecasting variable.
10  See ECB OBSERVER, Can the ECB do more for growth? p. 38.A case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy
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-  And third, as long as there is no full harmonization of savings patterns, business cycles
and taxes and regulations across the countries participating in the euro area, a broadly de-
fined monetary aggregate can be expected to remain fairly robust. From this point of view,
the enlargement of the euro area should function as a kind of stabilizer, supporting the va-
lidity of a broadly defined monetary aggregate such as M3.
From a theoretical point of view, the monetary analysis rests on the transaction equation,
which can be written as follows:
11
(1)  P Y V M ￿ = ￿ ,
where M = is the stock of money, V = the velocity of money, Y = real output and P = price
level. Equation (1) simply says that the stock of money, multiplied by the number of times a
money unit is used for financing purposes, equals the real output valued with its price level.
Taking logarithms and first differences of the variables (D), equation (1) can be easily rear-
ranged as follows:
(2) p y v m D + D = D + D .
When using long-term values of the variables, namely 2.0 to 2.5% for potential growth, 0.5 to
1.0% for the decline in velocity and an envisaged inflation of around 1.5%, the adequate mo-
ney supply growth is:
(3)  % 5 . 4 % 75 . 0 % 5 . 1 % 25 . 2 * * * » + + » D - D + D = D v p y m
T ,
where asterisks mark long-term values. To use the informational content of M3, the ECB
compares actual M3 growth rates with the reference value on a monthly, e.g. 3-month moving
average, basis. Persistent deviations in M3 growth from the reference value shall signal to the
ECB, under normal circumstances, danger to the future price stability and, consequently, a
need for policy action.
However, analysing the information content of M3 by making use of the reference value con-
cept suffers from two shortcomings. First, the demand for M3 seems to be stable over the long
rather than the short term. This finding is largely due to the fact that in the short-term non-
banks’ portfolio shifts, which are not necessarily related to inflation relevant transactions,
might well distort the indicator function of money aggregates, whereas in the long term, the
demand for money bears a relatively close relation to income and interest rates. As a result, a
focus on short-term comparisons of actual M3 growth with the 4½% reference value run the
risk of resulting in frequent (target) deviations, providing misleading policy recommendati-
ons. In addition, there might be a much more fundamental problem with the reference value
concept: in terms of its actual implementation, the question arises whether the concept will
actually succeed in delivering price stability.
                                                
11  The ECB’s monetary analysis includes M3, its components and counterparts, notably credit, and various
measures of excess liquidity.A case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy
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3.2 Modifications to the reference value concept
In principle, the ECB’s concept implies that the current year’s stock of M3 shall be expanded
at a constant rate. However, keeping the reference value for the next year constant is only
viable if the actual M3 expansion is measured against the envisaged M3 growth starting from
a “once and for all” fixed base period. If, however, the actual M3 expansion is simply measu-
red against a reference value that is held constant each year without taking into account excess
M3 growth built up in former periods, inflation target deviations could be the consequence:
even M3 growth rates close to the reference value could be accompanied by an unwanted rise
in the overall price level as M3 overhangs (defined as past deviations of actual M3 expansion
less the reference value) start feeding through into a higher price level.
So far, the ECB’s implementation of the reference value concept systematically disregards the
effects of real M3 overhangs built up in former periods, which, however, will subsequently
feed through into the price level. If the reference value is kept constant each year even though
M3 deviations have occurred in past periods, comparisons between actual M3 and the refe-
rence value become meaningless in terms of anticipating forthcoming ECB reactions, as the
central bank may have to act even though M3 expansion complies with the reference value. If
the central bank decides to set the reference value each year anew, an approach for determi-
ning the reference value for the coming period could – under certain assumptions – look as
follows:
12
next period’s envisaged M3 expansion = GDP potential growth
+ declining growth of the velocity trend
- (+) positive (negative) former M3 o-
verhangs (positive/negative price gap)
+ inflation forecast
+ normative inflation
(- other variables influencing future inflation)
According to this reference value calculation (which can be characterized as some form of
“formula flexibility”), the dynamics of money supply implications on future prices are syste-
matically taken into account. The time-lags are to be determined by an empirical analysis of
the relationship between inflation and current and past M3 overhangs. In the following, we
take a closer look at the so-called “price gap” or “real money gap”, which can be considered
as an “enlightened” way of using the information content of money.
                                                
12  See  Leschke, M., Polleit, T. (2001), Monetary Targeting – antiquated strategy of robust  stabiliser?, in:
INFER, Frankfurt, May.A case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy
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3.3 A case for the “price gap” or “real money gap”
The ECB has addressed the deficiency of the reference value concept outlined above by
publishing the so-called “real money gap”. This concept is closely affiliated with the so-called
P-star model.
13 To start with, the actual price level is:
(4) y v m p - + = .
The long-term price level can be formalised as:
(5) * * * y v m p - + = .
The difference between equations (5) and (4) is the so-called price gap:
(6a)  *) ( ) * ( * y y v v p p - + - = - .
The price gap ( ) * p p -  consists of (i) the liquidity gap  ) * ( v v -  and (ii) the output gap
*) ( y y - . Equation (6a) suggests that if, for instance, actual output exceeds potential (y > y*)
and actual velocity equals the long-term equilibrium (v = v*), the actual price level can be
expected to rise (in the future).
However, when analysing the “forces driving inflation” in the P-star concept, it is important
to note that, for instance, an increase in real output above potential will not cause a change of
the price gap as equation (6a) suggests: This is because v will rise as y increases, so that any
increase in the output gap is compensated by a decline in the liquidity gap. It is therefore re-
commendable to use a representation which shows that the price gap is actually independent
from the output gap: that the price gap is simply the difference between real money (adjusted
by the trend velocity) and real potential output:
(6b) * ) * ( * y p v m p p - - + = -
That said, inflation – a persistent rise in the price level – can only occur when “too much mo-
ney chasing too few goods” or, to put it differently, money is always and everywhere a mo-
netary phenomenon in the P-star concept.
14
                                                
13  This concept is actually based on the influential work of Hallman, J. J., Porter, R. D., Small, D. H. (1991), Is
the price level tied to the M2 monetary aggregate in the long run?, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 81,
No. 4, pp. 841 – 858. See also Svensson, L. E. O. (2000), “Does the P* Model Provide Any Rationale for
Monetary Targeting?” German Economic Review 1, pp. 69 – 81.
14 An empirically testable inflation forecasting model using the price gap as inflation indicator could look as
follows:  ￿
=
- + + + + - + =
n
i
t t i t i t t t N p p
1
1 0 1 ) * ( e p b b b p  where  1 + t p  is future inflation. If the actual price
level is lower (higher) than the equilibrium level, future inflation will accelerate (slow down) to close the
“gap”. As a result, one would expect the parameter  1 b  to be positive. Given the “stickiness” of inflation, oneA case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy
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Alternatively, the so-called “real money gap” is defined as actual money supply less actual
price level:
(7) p m mreal - = .
The real equilibrium real money holding is:
(8)  *
* p m mreal - = .
The difference between equation (7) und (8) is the real money gap, which represents nothing
other than the price gap with a negative sign:
(9) *) ( * *) ( ) (
* p p p p p m p m m m real real - - = + - = - - - = - .
Figure 2 on the following page shows the nominal and real money gap in the euro area from
the period December 1998 to April 2003.
Against the background of these findings, it is easily shown that a simple comparison between
actual money growth and the reference value might lead to misleading policy signals as mo-
netary expansions, which occurred in the past and will have a bearing on future prices, are
systematically neglected. Using a more formal approach, the equilibrium price level is:
(10) * * * y v m p
T - + = ,
where 
T m  is the envisaged money supply growth as determined by the reference value con-
cept. The deviation between the equilibrium and actual price level is:
(11) ) * ( ) ( ) ( *) * ( * p p m m y v m y v m p p
T T - + - = - + - - + = - .
The deviation of the envisaged from the actual price level can be explained by the deviation
of the envisaged from actual the stock of money and the price gap (or, alternatively, the nega-
tive real money gap). And only if the price gap is zero, it makes sense to base monetary policy
decisions on the reference value concept.
15
                                                                                                                                                        







p b .  t N  represents a vector of non-monetary
“cost push” variables (oil, wages, exchange rate, unemployment etc.).
15  See Görgens, E., Ruckriegel, K., Seitz, F. (2001), Europäische Geldpolitik, p. 124.A case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy
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Figure 2:  Nominal and real money gap in the euro area on the basis of M3 (in percent of the
















Nominal M3 gap Real M3 gap
Data source: ECB; Bloomberg; own calculations. – The nominal money gap is the difference between the actu-
al stock of M3 and a stability-conforming stock of M3 in percent of the stability-conforming stock of M3. The
lat-ter has been calculated as the stock of M3 prevailing in December 1998, expanding it in line with the refe-
rence value of 4½%. – The real money gap is defined as the nominal money gap minus the deviation of actual
inflation from the envisaged inflation assumed to be 1.5% in percent of the stability-conforming stock of M3.A case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy
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For further explanations of the structure of the model see www.ecb-observer.com.
Figure 3 shows actual and estimated inflation in the euro area in percent for the period 1982-
Q1 to 2003-Q1.
16 The estimation is based on the M3 price gap, the output gap, the exchange
rate and the oil price. The analysis shows that money plays a highly important role in deter-
mining inflation in the euro area. For instance, simulation analyses show that changes in the
output gap, exchange rate and oil price exert only temporary fluctuations in the consumer pri-
ce inflation whereas excess money has a lasting and persistent impact on euro area inflation.
4. Monetary targeting versus inflation targeting
As was noted earlier, recommendations have been put forward to integrate the first into the
second pillar or drop the use of a monetary aggregate altogether, adopting a direct “inflation
targeting”.
17 An inflation targeting framework is usually defined as one in which the central
bank aims to directly steer the final target variable, the inflation rate, without the use of a se-
parate intermediate target variable (such as, for instance, money, credit, exchange rates etc.).
                                                
16  For inflation estimates on the basis of the real money gap see, for instance, Gerlach, S., Svensson, L. E. O.
(2001), Money and inflation in the euro area: a case for monetary policy, Bank for International Settlements,
Working Papers No 98.
17  Beginning in the early 1990s, price stability became an increasingly important goal of the monetary authori-
ties in many countries. But some central banks found the traditional approaches – that is influencing inflation
and economic activity by controlling intermediate variables like monetary aggregates or an exchange rate –
not very successful. To address this problem, several industrialized countries – New Zealand (1990), Canada
(1991), the UK (1992), and Sweden (1993) – adopted “inflation target” regimes.A case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy
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These regimes are said to be transparent and therefore credible to the public, because the cent-
ral bank makes an explicit commitment to conduct monetary policy to meet a specified nume-
rical inflation rate target within a specified time frame. The explicit target provides an anchor
for monetary authorities, and it also serves as an anchor for private market expectations.
A closer look at a monetary policy assigning a prominent role to money as a main information
variable – usually referred to as “monetary targeting” – and a direct inflation targeting reveals
a number of common characteristics. Both concepts are based on achieving the same final
objective, price stability. In addition, both strategies are forward-looking and in practice a
wide range of indicators is employed to determine the need for monetary policy action. As in
practise a forward-looking inflation targeting has to make use of inflation indicators in order
to be effective, the remaining factor distinguishing the strategies is the ongoing (theoretical)
question about the adequacy of money serving as an inflation forecasting variable.
A forward-looking monetary policy has to rely on forward-looking indicators (or intermediate
variable) due to the well-known time-lag problem of monetary policy; this holds true for both
inflation targeting and monetary targeting. An intermediate variable has to meet at least three
requirements: the variable must (i) exhibit a close and reliable relation to the final policy ob-
jective, that is price stability; (ii) be influenced through monetary policy action; and (iii) re-
flect first and foremost monetary policy action rather than any other influences. That said, a
monetary variable meeting these properties naturally qualifies as a indicator variable par ex-
cellence and deserves special attention by monetary policy makers. So long as there is no al-
ternative (set of) variable(s) that forecast inflation more adequatedly than the stock of M3
(measured by the price gap or real money gap), the ECB should have a strong rationale to
continue to pay close attention to monetary developments in forming policy decisions.
Viewed in this way, inflation targeting can be characterised as an “umbrella strategy” under
which a policy based on the information function of money is a special case. So the question
about the appropriateness of assigning a prominent role to a monetary aggregate boils down to
an empirical answer: if a monetary aggregate contains considerable and reliable value for pre-
dicting future inflation, it is rational that monetary policy makers pay special attention to it.
Such a decision seems all the more rational when monetary aggregates’ inflation predicting
quality outperforms alternative (real or financial economic) indicators within a timeframe that
appears relevant from the point of view of monetary policy effectiveness.
18
5. Conclusions
From a conceptual point of view, the ECB two pillar monetary policy strategy is generally
suitable to deliver and maintain the bank’s price stability promise in the euro area. Under the
                                                
18  See Trecroci, C., Vega, J. L. (2000), The information content of M3 for future inflation; also Altimari, N.
(2001), Does money lead inflation in the euro area?, ECB Working Paper, No. 63.A case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy
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latest ECB strategy review, the role of money has, de facto, been downgraded to second rank
status. However, a strong theoretical and empirical rationale exists for continuing to assign a
prominent role to money. Empirical evidence points to the stability and controllability of mo-
ney demand, and a number of arguments lend some comfort to the view that the demand for
M3 might prove to be stable going forward. One may argue, however, that the ECB should
make use of the information content of the stock of money M3 by applying the so-called “price
gap” or “real money gap” rather than the reference value concept as the latter runs the risk of
giving misleading policy recommendations. This is because the implementation of the referen-
ce value concept systematically disregards monetary overhangs or deficits that have occurred
in the past and will affect price level movements in the future. Monetary policy following the
signals provided by the reference value concept rather than the price gap is unlikely to be in a
position to achieve its price stability objective and, moreover, runs the risk of compromising
the indicator quality of the stock of money in the form of M3.A case for money in the ECB monetary policy strategy
HfB – Business School of Finance & Management
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